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Air Law-Application of Federal Rules to Intrastate
Flight-Injuries from Low Flying
Defendantes dirigible flew over plaintiff's farm at an altitude of
150 to 200 feet, frightening plaintiff's horses, and causing injury to
plaintiff. One of plaintiff's allegations of negligence was violation
of federal air traffic rules,1 under which the minimum altitude for
flight is 500 feet.2 The petition failed to state whether this was an
interstate or an intrastate flight. Defendant's demurrer was over-
ruled, the court saying plaintiff had stated a case under federal law
which would not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If the flight
was intrastate, plaintiff's recovery would depend upon his proof that
violation of the altitude rule would affect interstate commerce.8
The Air Commerce Act declares: "It shall be unlawful . . . to
navigate any aircraft otherwise than in conformity with the air
traffic rules," 4 and the managers of the bill in congress said ". . the
air traffic rules are to apply whether the aircraft is engaged in . . .
interstate or intrastate navigation." 5  The court refuses to follow
these expressions and apply the federal rules to all intrastate flights,
but demands that some connection or interference with interstate
commerce be shown. Since flying is not sufficient per se, it is diffi-
cult to see how a violation of the altitude rule can possibly meet this
demand, and the court, expressly recognizing the difficulty, was most
liberal in overruling the demurrer.
It is possible only to surmise what connection with interstate
commerce the courts will require before allowing the application of
federal rules to instrastate flight. In the analogous field of railroad
transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been al-
lowed to exercise authority over intrastate rates and service if inter-
state commerce was even remotely affected, 6 the famous Shreveport
'Chapter V of Air Commerce Regulations issued by Secretary of Commerce
in accordance with Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 570, 49 U. S. C. A.(1929, Supp.) §173 (e).
'Air Commerce Regulations, c. V, §81 (G).
'Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D. Ohio,
1929).
'44 Stat. 574, 49 U. S. C. A. §181 (A) (5).
'Congressional Rec., May 13, 1926, p. 9390.
'Notes (1921) 14 A. L. R. 454; (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1100 and cases cited.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Rate Case7 being the landmark in this field. These decisions involv-
ing railroad transportation and the liberal attitude taken in the prin-
cipal case indicate that the courts will not be exacting in their re-
quirements.8 There seems to be good cause for Mr. W. R. Mc-
Cracken's assertion 9 that ". . . the regulation of aerial navigation
will ultimately be either largely or exclusively vested in the federal
government. ..."10
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, as adopted by twenty
states, including North Carolina, 1 does not fix a definite minimum
altitude for flight, but makes it unlawful to fly so low that existing
use of the land will be interfered with. In a state court, under
this statute, the present plaintiff could probably recover.
H. L. LOBDELL.
Bailments-Proof of Loss and Presumption of Negligence-
Stipulations Against Negligence
The United States Lines issued specifications and requested bids
for the repair of the steamship America. The bids received were too
high. The specifications were changed and the defendant shipyard
received the contract on the second bidding. Und'er the first set of
specifications the contractor was required to carry insurance on the
ship for $2,000,000, owner's benefit, and premium $5,000. By the
contract agreed upon, under the second set of specifications, it was
provided, ". . . The United States Lines will continue the present
hull, machinery, and equipment insurance upon the vessel during the
period the vessel is at the contractor's yard. . . ." While in the
possession of the defendant, the ship was damaged seriously by fire.
"234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1913). This case was charac-
terized by Senator Glass of Virginia as the case "which practically extirpated
every remaining right any state had over intrastate commerce." Associated
Press dispatch of Feb. 10, 1930.
8 Nor have th6 courts been exacting in determining what constitutes inter-
state commerce itself. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999 (1871)
(holding that a steamboat plying between two points in same state, but carrying
goods destined for points outside the state, was engaged in interstate commerce).
Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 250 U. S. 101, 39 Sup. Ct. 396, 63 L. ed.
869 (1919) (holding that a cook for a crew repairing a railroad bridge was
engaged in interstate commerce).
'McCracken, Air Law (1923) 57 Am. L. Ray. 97.
" Dean Bogert of Cornell looks askance upon this possibility, and declares
the principle of allowing federal interference with intrastate commerce "is one
which should be sparingly applied." Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1921)
6 CORN. L. Q. 271.
" p. L. 1929, c. 190, §4; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1929 Supp.) §191 (M).
